Wednesday, May 18, 2016

Wikis s BAG Archive: MEXICO REBUILDING TIES TO VENEZUELA, SLOWLY





Reference ID 08MEXICO3178
Crted 2008-10-27 18:06
Relsed 2010-12-18 21:09
Classifiion SECRET//NOFORN
Origin Embassy Mexico

VZCZCXRO5863
RR RUEH RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3178/01 3011811
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271811Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3711
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1442
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUTRS/DEPT OF TRSURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/R USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUBND/D HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 003178

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO REBUILDING TIES TO VENEZUELA, SLOWLY

REF: A. MEXICO 000185
¶B. MEXICO 000886
¶C. LIMA 000663

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Rson: 1.4 (b), (d).




¶1. (C) Summary. President Felipe Calderon has attempted sincetaking to repair ties with Venezuela, and the ForeignMinistry has said that Mexico is slowly making improvements.Nevertheless, several points of friction, such as the lack ofa Venezuelan ambassador in Mexico City, suspicions aboutVenezuelan outrch activities in Mexico, and theexpropriation by Venezuela of Mexican assets have prevented\and probably will continue to prevent the relationship frombecoming truly warm. On the Bolivarian promotion front,Venezuela is clrly conducting outrch activities inMexico, but to what apprs to be little avail. Mexico doesnot offer the kind of fertile ground for Bolivarian activismas do some other countries in the hemisphere. A mistrust offoreign interventionism and lessons lrned from the 2006presidential election probably will prevent the Bolivarianmovement from impacting significantly the Mexican politicalor social scene. End Summary.

Mexico Working to Strengthen Ties
---------------------------------

¶2. (C) President Calderon since taking in 2006 hassought to repair Mexico's tattered relationship with
Venezuela as part of his efforts to position Mexico to take astronger ldership role in Latin America and conduct"respectful relations" with all nations (ref a). DespiteChavez's initial refusal to recognize the legitimacy ofCalderon's victory in the contested 2006 presidentialelection, the two countries reinstated full bilateral
ties--the Fox administration had revoked the VenezuelanAmbassador's credentials and recalled its own ambassador inCaracas--and Mexico has sought to maintain a cordial tone inthe conduct of its affairs with its southern neighbor. TheCalderon government responded relatively quietly even toChavez's contentious decision to nationalize Mexican cementgiant Cemex's Venezuela-based assets, expressing concern and
promising to protect Mexican interests abroad, but withouttaking any retaliatory msures. The Foreign Ministry's(SRE) Director for South America, Rafael Bernal Cuevas, toldPoloff on October 23 that Mexico's relations with Venezuelahave not recovered their pre-Chavez cordiality, but that theyare slowly moving in that direction. In her Septembertestimony before congress, Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosaalso outlined steps Mexico had taken and continues to take toimprove relations with Venezuela.

A Few Bumps in the Road
-----------------------

¶3. (C) Despite the improvement in bilateral relations sincethe Fox administration, Bernal outlined several points offriction. He noted that Venezuela still had yet to replaceformer Venezuelan Ambassador to Mexico Roy Chaderton after hewas named Venezuela's Permanent Representative to theOrganization of American States in April. Bernal said theextended absence of an ambassador made the conduct ofbilateral relations in Mexico City "uncomfortable." He alsosaid that Mexico is not hvily involved in the Cemexnegotiations at Cemex's request, but is carefully monitoringthe progress of the talks.

¶4. (C) Like Venezuela, Mexico is also looking to assert itsldership in the region, particularly in Central America.Bosco Marti, the Director of SRE's Plan Puebla Panama ,complained to Poloff that Mexico could not compete withVenezuela when it came to the kind of money it was tossing atmember countries through its ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative ofthe Americas) initiative.

¶5. (S/NF) In response to Poloff's question about pressreports that Mexico would look to put an end to MiracleMission flights into the country, Bernal said that Mexico wastrying to regulate the program and codify it in officialbilateral channels, rather than allowing it to be negotiated

MEXICO 00003178 002 OF 004


and executed at the local level. One article had reportedthat the Foreign Ministry wanted flights to be registered ascommercial airline and pass through appropriate securitymsures upon landing in Mexico rather than entering with"extraordinary permits," as had been occurring. Bernal madediscreet reference to Mexican concern about the ideologicalcomponent to the program, and said that at the very lst,Mexican patients were returning to Mexico with the messagethat the Venezuelan government provided a service to themtheir own government could or would not. Sensitivecollateral reporting suggests that the GOM as of Septemberwas concerned that Miracle Mission patients receivedpro-Venezuelan and anti-US briefings as part of their stay inVenezuela. The GOM was reportedly worried that such patientsreturned to Mexico more sympathetic to pro-Chavez themes andwere more likely to participate in associated marches orrallies. Bernal mentioned the presence of Bolivarian groupsin Mexico, but noted that such groups exist throughout the
world and that, as a democracy, Mexico had to offer themfreedom of expression.

Venezuela Looking to Sprd the Revolution
------------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Mexico City daily El Universal reported in October2007 on a purported Venezuelan government document laying outa 2007-2013 political and economic development plan whichincluded points on strengthening alternative movements inMexico to "brk away from imperial domination" with the
larger goal of rallying "the masses" worldwide in "support of
the revolutionary process." In line with this strategic
objective, Venezuela is seeking to cultivate support at the
grassroots level in Mexico, primarily through social programs
and low levels of financial and logistical support.

Who Is Involved?
----------------

¶7. (C) Analysts from the Mexican National lice Center(CISEN) told Poloffs on October 2 that they have identifiedsome 500 serious Bolivarian activists--all Mexicancitizens--across the country, which are often in contact withch other and tend to be linked to larger social movements.CISEN noted that many Bolivarian sympathizers are tied backto the Red de Solidaridad con Cuba, which has been active fordecades but which has appropriated Chavez's rhetoric in orderto freshen its own discourse. In addition to the Cubansupport networks, a chapter of the region-wide BolivarianContinental Coordinator operates in Mexico, and otherpro-Venezuela activists are linked to the Worker's Party (PT)and different student groups operating out of the NationalAutonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). XXXXXXXXXXXX arecent XXXXXXXXXXXXconfirmed to Poloff that most pro-Venezuelan student groupsare run from the political science and philosophydepartments, from which hailed Lucia Morett, the Mexicanstudent who survived the bombing of Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC) lder Raul Reyes' Ecuadorian campin March. He also noted that in a school with a populationover 300,000, political ideologies of every persuasion arebound to be represented.

¶8. (S/NF) Minister Counselor Jaime Acosta and Politicalr Paola Houin from the Colombian Embassy in MexicoCity told Poloff that Venezuela has a considerable presencein Mexico, noting that a of legislators (who they didnot name) openly support Chavez. Sensitive collateralreporting indies that Venezuelan officials also haveregular contact with members of the Democratic RevolutionaryParty (PRD), specifically Ruth Zavaleta and members of theNew Left Faction, the New Alliance Party (PANAL) and theWorkers Party (PT).

Who Is (Maybe) Not
------------------

¶9. (S/NF) After Chavez's public endorsement of 2006presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador didnothing but tarnish the PRD lder's campaign, many Mexicanpoliticians are wary of cozying too much up to the Venezuelanpresident. CISEN told Poloff that it has no evidence, for

MEXICO 00003178 003 OF 004


example, that Venezuela currently is providing direct fundingto Mexican political candidates, nor to they think it islikely in the runup to the 2009 legislative and gubernatorialelections. The analysts believe that most political ldershave lrned from 2006 not to risk their candidacy byaccepting Chavez's support, either overtly or covertly.Sensitive collateral reporting also indies that theVenezuelan Embassy has been unsuccessful in building rapportwith Lopez Obrador, who has reportedly decided not to
establish a relationship with the GOV so as not to risk his
reputation.

¶10. (C) CISEN is looking for close links between Venezuelaand the more radical, violent groups in Mexico. CISEN hasyet to uncover concrete links between the PopularRevolutionary Party (EPR) and Venezuela, but continues toinvestigate given the ideological affinity between them.

What Is Offered
---------------

¶11. (C) As it has throughout the hemisphere, Venezuela seeksto woo Mexicans via social handouts to impoverished groupsand modest financial support to its like-minded Mexicancohorts. CISEN reported that the Venezuelan Embassy inMexico is providing small donations to pro-Bolivarianorganizations, mostly for operating expenses such as vehiclesand propaganda. CISEN suspects, however, that the Embassyalso provides funding for members of these organizations totravel to Bolivarian Congresses of Latin American leftistgroups, such as the event Morett attended in Quito prior tolving for Reyes' camp (ref b).

¶12. (C) Venezuela's ability to implement large-scale oreffective social programs in Mexico seems limited, at best.CISEN said that Venezuela has established two medical clinicsin northern Mexico, including in Nuevo Leon State, but theyhave yet to open for business. Moreover, CISEN reported thatonly a handful of Mexicans have participated in Venezuela's"Miracle Mission," which offers low-cost eye surgery to
Mexicans in Venezuela. El Universal reported on October 20that some 509 Mexicans have received trtment, which is insharp contrast, for example, to the tens of thousands ofPeruvians who have partaken (ref c) in the program. CISENopined that, unlike some of their poorer and smaller LatinAmerican neighbors, Mexico offers significantly more socialsupport. The Hlth Secretary, for example, publishedfigures indiing that between January and July 2008, over26,000 Mexicans have received eye surgeries through Mexico'sown programs. CISEN noted that Cuba also provides a literacytcher training program in Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and
Tabasco and scholarships for Mexican students to study in
Cuba, but that the Venezuelan and Cuban Embassies seem to
operate quite independently on most matters in Mexico.

¶13. (S/NF) Venezuela's efforts are being furthercircumscribed by resource limitations and GOM trepidation.
Sensitive collateral reporting indies that as of rlyOctober, the Venezuelan Embassy was finding it virtuallyimpossible to undertake pro-Bolivarian activities inMexico--such as holding events or hosting
delegations--because of lack of funding from the Venezuelangovernment. The Mexican government is also less thanreceptive to Venezuela's outrch efforts. The attempt tomore strictly regulate the Miracle Mission program in Mexico,for example, probably reflects GOM suspicion as theVenezuela's goals for and conduct of the program.

Comment
-------

¶14. (C) Calderon and the Foreign Ministry still apprcommitted to strengthening Mexico's ties with Venezuela aspart of a strategy to position Mexico in a ldership role inthe region and maintain friendly relationships with all itsneighbors. Nevertheless, due to the ideological gap betweenCalderon and Chavez and several points of minor--but stillsignificant--irritation, relations will probably continue tobe less than warm. Chavez's tardiness in appointing a newambassador to Mexico, for example, certainly has rankled theprotocol-obsessed SRE, and has hampered progress on bilateral

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issues in Mexico City.

¶15. (C) Venezuela is conducting outrch activities inMexico, but to what seems to be little effect. Mexico doesnot offer the kind of fertile ground to Bolivarian activismas compared with some other countries in the hemisphere. Amistrust of foreign interventionism and lessons lrned fromthe 2006 presidential election probably will prevent theBolivarian movement from having much influence in the Mexicanpolitical or social scene. Post will continue to watch forsigns that Venezuela is incrsing ties to some of Mexico'smore dangerous radical groups, in particular the EPR.Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site athttp://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North AmericanPartnership Blog at http://www.ink.gov/communities/state/nap /
GARZA

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