Wikis s BAG Archives: Australia Related (Part-8)

178268

11/14/2008 7:03
08CANBERRA1157
Embassy Canberra
SECRET//NOFORN


VZCZCXYZ0000PP RUEHWEBDE RUEHBY #1157/01 3190703ZNY SSSSS ZZ 140703Z NOV 08FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRATO RUIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0522


S E C R E T CANBERRA 001159 SENSITIVE NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR AND P/ANP E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018 TAGS: PINR, PREL, AS

SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: 2008 ANNUAL INR-ONA LICE EXCHANGE
REF: CANBERRA 1157 Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole for rsons 1.4(a), (b ), (c) and (d)

Corrected copy to change classifiion levels of paragraphs 20 and 21. 1.

(S//NF) Summary: The 2008 lice exchange between the Department of State Buru of lice and Resrch (INR) and the Australian of National Assessments (ONA) was held in Canberra, Australia on Tuesday, 14 October 2008. The ONA-hosted event covered a wide range of countries and themes, including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, the Kors, China, Russia, Indonesia and the Philippines. A/S Randall Fort led the INR delegation, with INR analysts providing opening remarks in the discussions of Iran and Russia and responding to ONA presentations on South and Northst Asia. ----------

Courtesy Call with D/DIO ----------

2. (S//NF) A/S Fort and POLOF on Monday, 13 October, met with Major eral Maurie McNarn, Director of the Australian Defence lice Organization (DIO) and his deputy, Mr. Michael Shoebridge at DIO HQ. The group discussed the capabilities of Japanese lice service interlocutors, comparing views based on the INR delegation's recent exchange in Tokyo and those of DIO seniors' and analysts' similar interactions. McNarn agreed that there were signs of progress within the senior levels of the Japanese IC regarding trilateral US-AUS-JPN efforts against countries of mutual concern-particularly within the defense lice establishment against such themes as North Korn WMD and China's naval capabilities-but noted that incompatible security standards continued to be a major hindrance precluding more robust collaboration. McNarn and Shoebridge were particularly interested in A/S Fort's comments on INR's role in lding US lice Community efforts within the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), noting that the Australian lice community was "hard pressed" to understand the full extent of the thrt, let alone serve in a position to ld the coordination of any interacy mitigation efforts. McNarn said the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) had "the ld" for Australia in tackling the issue but was more focused on traditional lice collection/counterlice themes, and that Australian lice would need to stay engaged with its US counterparts to share lessons lrned in the cyber arena. ----------

Courtesy Call with DG/ONA ----------

3. (S//NF) A/S Fort and POLOF on Tuesday, 14 October, met with Peter Varghese, Director eral of the Australian of National Assessments, in his prior to the kickoff of the formal lice exchange at ONA hdquarters. Varghese made comments similar to those of D/DIO regarding the strengths, wknesses, and personalities of ONA's Japanese lice counterparts. The conversation segued into a discussion of the evolving role of all-source analysis in an environment where senior government officials and other customers had much grter access to information electronically and were incrsingly focused on informing, analyzing, and shaping policy options. Varghese asserted that this crted an important challenge for ONA and other lice services, with relevance in the information age-where "once-secret information was incrsingly available through open sources"- determined by the speed and efficiency by which analysts can sift through the volume to highlight "what is important" and put it into context for decision makers. context for decision makers. ----------

Global Overview ----------

4. (S//NF) The official lice exchange began with ch hd of delegation providing eral introductions of their respective participants and short opening remarks, followed by a "Global Overview" presentation by DG/ONA of Australia's perspective of its security situation and the role of lice in informing Australian policymakers in the coming yrs.

5. (S//NF) Varghese said that ONA was outlining to its customers in the Australian policymaking community a world out to 2030 in which the strategic and economic "Balance of power" was shifting, with the US remaining the preeminent global entity, but facing incrsing challenges, especially from emerging or reemerging states like China, Russia, and India. Varghese described the rise of China as the most notable development over the last decade, with an economy on track to become the world's largest by 2020, a rapidly modernizing military that could pose a direct challenge to the US within the region, and an incrsingly assertive foreign policy. Varghese described India as "moving from a rhetorical to an interest-based approach" in its international relations-noting that many countries looked to Delhi as the "best option" to serve as a counterweight to Beijing-but cautioned that India's internal social, political, and economic divisions were the grtest impediments to achieving this strategic potential. Varghese said that ONA viewed the US-Japan-China triangular relationship as paramount to the security of Northst Asia, both in regard to China's rise and the dangers posed by North Kor. Varghese described ONA's "line" on Southst Asia as "erally doing better than many had expected, but with danger signs in Thailand." In the Middle st, Iran clrly represented the grtest challenge to regional stability-and ONA was focusing most of its attention on Tehran because of it. Varghese asserted that worldwide "Nonproliferation is under stress," citing North Kor, Iran, and Syria as the most recent examples, but terrorism was "a good news story that is getting better, with the violent Islamist thrt receding." He concluded with his views on the changing role of international institutions, predicting that as "bilateral approaches rch their limits and multilateralism shows itself unworkable, new institutions that reflect a 'plurilateral' approach will emerge."

6. (S//NF) When pressed on ONA's assessment of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, Varghese answered that the growth of Islamic extremism-based movements is constrained, thanks in part to ongoing successes in combined counterterrorism efforts, but more because of societal factors in Southst Asia that reject the middle-stern Jihadist model. Varghese and his analysts assessed that Indonesia Islam was "returning to its main course following a detour" driven by personal linkages to the Global Jihad that were formed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. ONA assessed that al-Qa'ida ultimately has failed to achieve the strategic ldership role it sought within the Islamic world. ----------

Iran ----------

7. (S//NF) ONA analysts thanked the INR Iran analyst for his opening comments, which they described as "unconventional," "provoive," and "worthy of further discussion."

8. (S//NF) ONA analysts assessed that Tehran "knows" about its lack of certain capabilities, but plays "beyond its hand" very skillfully. ONA analysts commented that Iran's Persian culture was a factor in understanding its strategic behavior, commenting that a "mixture of hubris and paranoia" pervades Iranian attitudes that in turn shape Tehran's thrt perceptions and policies. ONA judged that Iran's activities in Iraq - both overt and covert-represented an extreme manifestation of Iranian strategic calculus, designed to "outflank" the US in the region. ONA asserted that-twenty yrs of hostility and associated rhetoric aside-regime Qyrs of hostility and associated rhetoric aside-regime attitudes "have fairly shallow roots," and the most effective mns by which Tehran could ensure its national security would be a strategic relationship with the US via some "grand bargain." ONA viewed Tehran's nuclr program within the paradigm of "the laws of deterrence," noting that Iran's ability to produce a wpon may be "enough" to meet its security objectives. Nevertheless, Australian lice viewed Tehran's pursuit of full self-sufficiency in the nuclr fuel cycle, long-standing covert wpons program, and continued work on delivery systems as strong indiors that Tehran's preferred end state included a nuclr arsenal. According to ONA, they are not alone in this assessment, asserting "while China and Russia remain opposed to it, they view Iran's acquisition of nuclr wpons as inevitable." Varghese concluded the discussion, commenting ONA is telling its customers "It's a mistake to think of Iran as a 'Rogue State'."

9. (S//NF) ONA seniors and analysts were particularly interested in A/S Fort and INR's assessments on Israeli "red lines" on Iran's nuclr program and the likelihood of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclr facilities. -----

Pakistan-Afghanistan ----------

10. (S//NF) ONA analysts led the discussion of Afghanistan and Pakistan, asserting that Afghan President Karzai's description of the two countries as "conjoined twins" may be accurate in the fact that "illness in one body affects the other," but his tendency to blame Pakistan for all of Afghanistan's problems ignores rlity. ONA assesses that the Taliban is not only resilient-but gaining momentum-and "the insurts think they are winning." ONA analysts emphasized lice trends in cross-border activities, safehavens, and divisions within Pakistani security services that highlight their growing concerns about Pakistan, saying that while it is unlikely to fail, it is becoming more fractured and in danger of brkdowns in central control where the security of Islamabad's nuclr wpons could come under thrt. According to ONA, Pakistan's economic downturn thrtens its ability to focus on counterterrorism, mass unrest, and territorial governance. On a positive note, ONA assessed that "opportunities exist at the tribal level, where the state is unwilling or unable to achieve and/or sustain presence" to engage on common security concerns-noting that while Pakistan's tribal ars were not directly comparable to those in Iraq, some "lessons lrned" could be applied in winning the support of the local populace. ONA concluded its presentation by posing an open question of the degree to which the Taliban will have some role in Afghanistan's future, given Karzai's outrch under the rubric of "reconciliation."

11. (S//NF) Varghese commented that in personal meetings and lice exchanges with ONA and other Australian services, Pakistani eral Kayani continually comes across as ambivalent on the issues of counterterrorism and counterinsurcy, reiterating that India remains the core mission-and priority-of the Pakistan defense and lice establishment. ONA assesses that Pakistan's military and security elite view this as "an American war," which combined with a very hard sense of anti-Americanism combines into "a very dangerous cocktail." ----------

Northst Asia ----------

12. (S//NF) ONA analysts led the discussion of Northst Asia during a working lunch, providing a regional overview that included China, Japan, Taiwan, the Kors, Russia, and India. ONA assessed that China, clrly rising to be the region's preeminent power, was focused on a perception management campaign to contain any notions of a "China thrt," while Japan was "divided internally" on such basic issues as defining "its own place" in Asia and the modern world-despite its push for a st on the UN Security Council. ONA viewed the management of the US-Japan alliance as the single most important factor shaping the security of Northst Asia, whether to balance China, prevent a conflict on the Taiwan Strait, or deter North Kor. ONA viewed the Taiwan Strait situation as "cooling," but stated that the long-term trajectory was negative-especially as Chinese military capabilities grow rapidly in parallel with unmet expectations for a KMT-led government in Taipei "to deliver" on improved ties to the mainland.

13. (S//NF) ONA highlighted India as the strategic power-once firmly ensconced in the non-aligned movement-being courted by the US and its allies to balance China's rise, but noted India's social system and economic disparities posed Qnoted India's social system and economic disparities posed unaddressed sources of internal instability that ultimately undermined its nr-term effectiveness and long-term potential. ONA assessed that Japan would continue to push for incrsed engagement and investment in India, but asserted that Japanese cultural chauvanism continued to be an underlying issue that hindered improved economic and security ties with India. ONA argued that China's ability to acquire "strategic depth" was limited by geography, and that this-combined with an export driven economy that demanded access to international energy, resources, and trade networks-constrained its ability to exert an uncontested sphere of influence akin to the US or Soviet Union during the Cold War. ----------

Russia ----------

14. (S//NF) ONA analysts concurred with INR analysts' comments on Russia, describing Russia as both "A rising power and a declining state," with a resurt determination to leverage military force to protect its interests even as demographic trends indied a diminishing population base from which to support a large-scale military buildup. ONA asserted that demographics were "starting to bite this yr," especially in labor sources, and posited that the negative trends in Russia's long-term sustainability were exbated by its over-reliance on energy exports for revenues and compounded by incrsing economic interdependence with the west. ONA acknowledged that much of its analysis of Russian intent was linked to its focus on the accumulation of power of the former President and the "securicrats," commenting that ONA had "gotten to know Putin very well over the last few yrs" and that he "set the tone" for Russia's actions at home and abroad.

15. (S//NF) ONA described the Baltic states and Ukraine as "countries that are in Russia's sights," with the dangerous similarities in Moscow's view of the ethnically Russian population and strategic geography of Crim to those which motivated its recent actions against Georgia. ----------

Southst Asia ----------

16. (S//NF) ONA analysts described their outlook for Southst Asia as "fairly benign," as the region was erally stable and its states were unlikely to come in to conflict with one another in the nr term. ONA flagged Thailand's ongoing political crisis as the most troublesome development, observing that current events were driving the country to a boiling point and that it would "will have to make a choice" between democracy-warts and all-and a coup culture reliant upon the of an incrsingly fragile monarchy for unity and legitimacy. ONA assessed that the PAD's objectives-to force the government from power via the military and monarchy-are grounded in a widely-shared view that democratically elected officials cannot resist corruption within the current system, suggesting a cycle of dysfunction with no signs of improvement short of royal intervention or revolutionary change. The political climate in Bangkok was a major distraction for Thailand's military and elites, which bodes poorly for the prospects of containing and defting the southern insurcy, which was incrsingly demonstrating a sophistied cell structure and lethal, well-coordinated terror tactics.

17. (S//NF) Turning briefly to Malaysia, the Australians said that Singapore's lice services and Lee Kuan Yew have told ONA in their exchanges that opposition lder Anwar "did indeed commit the acts for which he is currently indicted," citing unshared technical lice. ONA assessed, and their Singapore counterparts concurred, "it was a set up job-and he probably knew that, but walked into it anyway."

18. (S//NF) ONA analysts assess "the tide has turned" on Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, noting that its ldership has been devastated-with most seniors killed, captured, or on the run-and that it has lost its local support networks and funding. ONA judged JI was shifting nr term goals to its local, vice global/anti-western, interests while otherwise "creeping back to the shadows" and focusing on survival. JI would endure and reerate over the long term, albeit as a more localized terrorist thrt. ONA and the National Thrt Assessment Center (NTAC) of the Australian Security lice Organization (ASIO) agreed that the QSecurity lice Organization (ASIO) agreed that the impending execution of the Bali bombers probably would not precipitate retaliatory terrorist attacks against Western interests, but small scale operations within and against Indonesian government and security were more likely.

19. (S//NF) ONA asserted that the success of CT efforts in Indonesia were a "study in contrast" to the ongoing downward slide in the Philippines, where the collapse of the pce process in the South thrtened to make this ar "the new regional incubator of terrorist Jihadis." ONA terrorism specialists noted signals and human lice that JI "structuralists" embedded with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were rethinking plans to return to Indonesia, while JI "freelancers" were becoming more active and better linked with Abu Sayyaf Group operatives. ONA judged that the Southern Philippines incrsingly contained "all the ingredients of al Qa'ida's favored tilling ground." ----------

Dinner ----------

20. (S//NF) ONA hosted an official dinner at the Ottoman Restaurant for A/S Fort and his tm of INR analysts. Peter Varghese used the dinner as a chance to prompt further discussions on several themes from the exchange, including the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran and the long-term impact of Russia's recent military action against Georgia.

21. (S//NF) ONA Attendees/Interlocutors: Peter Varghese DG/ONA Brendon Hammer DDG/ONA Hther Smith DDG/ONA John Besemeres ADG, Americas and Europe Branch Harry n ADG, North and South Asia Branch Peter McDonald ADG, Ocna Branch Russ Swinnerton Acting ADG, Southst Asia Branch Ian Parmeter ADG, Middle st and Africa Branch Ashton Robinson ADG, Transnational Issues Branch Carolyn Patteson ADG, Executive and Foreign lice Coordination Branch Aldo Borgu Senior Analyst, Strategic Issue Branch Neil Hawkins Senior Analyst, Middle st and Africa Branch Jacinta Sanders Senior Analyst, Middle st and Africa Branch Derek Lundy Senior Analyst, Strategic Analysis Branch Bruce Luckham Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch Graehame Carroll Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch Mike Hillman Consultant, North and South Asia Branch Julia Dixon Senior Analyst, Transnational Issue Branch Bruce Luckham Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch John Phipps Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch Bill Wise Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch Roger Hodgkins Senior Analyst, North and South Asia Branch Luke Yman Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch Kyle Wilson Senior Analyst, Americas and Europe Branch David Wall Senior Analyst, Americas and Europe Branch Susan Creighton Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch Christopher Collier Senior Analyst, Southst Asia Branch Marcus Lumb Senior Analyst, Southst Asia Branch Simone Alesich Senior Analyst, Southst Asia Branch Kevin Smith Senior Analyst, International Economy Branch MCCALLUM




199457
3/30/2009 5:49
09CANBERRA320
Embassy Canberra
SECRET//NOFORN

09STATE25892

VZCZCXYZ0001PP RUEHWEBDE RUEHBY #0320 0890549ZNY SSSSS ZZ 300549Z MAR 09FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRATO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1289

S E C R E T CANBERRA 000320 NOFORN SIPDIS PLSE PASS TO INR/TCA J. BARNES AND INR/TCA K. TELLEEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2034 TAGS: AS, PINR, PREL, ZR

SUBJECT: REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL RCTION TO, AND VIEWS ON, POTENTIAL U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 25892 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JAMES F. COLE. RSON: 1.4 (c) and (d)

1.(C/NF) Post's senior USIC Reps discussed Ref message during a 24 March 2009 biweekly meeting. Reps were present from CIA, NSA, NRO, NGA, FBI, DIA, and the State Department. By way of background, the USIC's primary Australian counterparts on matters involving Iran include the National Security Advisor, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Secret lice Service (ASIS), of National Assessments (ONA), Defence lice Organization (DIO), Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), Australian Security lice Organization (ASIO), Defence ry and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), of the Undersecretary of Defence for lice (aDoD USDI), and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

2. (C/NF) Following is a summary of USIC observations, based on their regular engagement on Iran: (S/NOFORN) The Australian lice Community (AIC) has incrsed its collection and analytic efforts on Iran over the past decade, demonstrating Australia's strategic commitment to engage substantively as a significant US partner on Iran. Given the USIC's broad engagement across the AIC, we can say with high confidence that the Government of Australia and the AIC will pose no specific objections to efforts by the United States to incrse its level of engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. (S/NF) While Australian troops remain stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq, we predict the Australians will look to incrsed US engagement with Iran to improve upon crting a rlistic framework for an accelerated reduction and eventual cessation of Iranian support to the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and related groups, and Hizballah. Simultaneously, Australia will look for incrsed US-Iranian engagement to ld to a more stable governance environment for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Levant. We assess that the AIC and GOA will have the patience to take a long-view on these hard topics.

4. (S/NF) The AIC's lding concerns with respect to Iran's nuclr ambitions center on understanding the time frame of a possible wpons capability, and working with the United States to prevent Israel from independently launching uncoordinated military strikes against Iran. They are immediately concerned that Iran's pursuit of nuclr capabilities would ld to a conventional war-or even nuclr exchange-in the Middle st involving the United States that would draw Australia into a conflict. Canberra is more broadly concerned about the potential for renewed nuclr proliferation in the Middle st, driving Southst Asian states to abandon the NPT and pursue their own nuclr capabilities-which could introduce a direct thrt to the Australian homeland. RICHE